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Abstract
Coordination models have been used in macroeconomics to study a variety of crises phe-
nomena. It is well understood that, in these models, aggregate fluctuations can be purely self-
fulfilling. In this paper I highlight that cross-sectional heterogeneity in expectations regarding
the endogenous prospects of the economy can also emerge as a purely self-fulfilling equilibrium
property. This in turn leads to some intriguing positive and normative implications: (i) It can
rationalize idiosyncratic investor sentiment, (ii) It can be the source of significant heterogeneity
in real and financial investment choices, even in the absence of any heterogeneity in individual
characteristics or information about all economic fundamentals, and despite the presence of a
strong incentive to coordinate on the same course of action, (iii) It can sustain rich fluctuations
in aggregate investment and asset prices, including fluctuations that are smoother than those
often associated with multiple-equilibria models of crises, (iv) It can capture the idea that in-
vestors learn slowly how to coordinate on a certain course of action, (v) It can boost welfare.
(vi) It can render apparent coordination failures evidence of improved efficiency.
JEL codes: D82, D84, E32, Gil.
Keywords: Sunspots, animal spirits, complementarity, coordination failure, self-fulfilling expec-
tations, fluctuations, heterogeneity, correlated equilibrium.
'An earlier version was entitled "Private Sunspots and Idiosyncratic Investor Sentiment.'

1 Introduction
Following the contributions of Shell (1977), Azariadis (1981), Cass and Shell (1983), and Diamond
and Dybvig (1983), a voluminous literature has argued that animal spirits, sunspots, or other forms
of extrinsic uncertainty, can be the cause of aggregate fluctuations and has associated economic
downturns or financial crises with coordination failures. Motivated by a different set of issues,
Aumann's (1974, 1987) seminal work on correlated equilibria effectively showed that extrinsic un-
certainty can be largely idiosyncratic and that it can help rationalize a larger set of outcomes than
Nash equilibrium. Since then, correlated equilibria have been widely studied in game theory. Yet,
their implications for macroeconomic applications have hardly been explored. The goal of this paper
is to contribute towards filling this gap by studying the positive and normative implications that
the introduction of idiosyncratic extrinsic uncertainty can have for a class of models that is widely
used in macroeconomics to study coordination failures and crises phenomena.
In particular, I consider two closely related models. The first is a simple real investment game
that abstracts from financial prices. The second is a variant that stylizes trading in financial markets.
The common essential feature of the two models is that they introduce strategic complementarity in
investment choices: an individual investor is more willing to invest when he expects others also to
invest. Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Obstfeld (1986, 1996), such a complementarity
could capture the role of coordination in bank runs, speculative currency attacks, and other crises
phenomena. Similar coordination problems could also originate in a variety of production, demand,
thick-market, or credit-related externalities. The particular models considered here are close cousins
of those used in the applied global-games literature by Morris and Shin (1998, 2001) and others.
To deliver the central result of this paper in its sharpest form, I rule out any exogenous source of
heterogeneity: all investors have identical preferences, face identical constraints, and share the same
information about exogenous productivity and all other relevant economic fundamentals. These
assumptions ensure that all investors would choose exactly the same level of investment if their
choices had been strategically independent. One may expect this conclusion not to be affected by
the presence of a complementarity in investment choices: if all investors find it optimal to make
the same choice when they do not care about one another's choices, why should they do anything
different when they only have a desire to align their choices with one another? Yet, there now exist
equilibria in which identical investors make different investment choices.
The key to this apparent paradox is that individual investors may now face idiosyncratic extrinsic
uncertainty about the aggregate level of investment. That is, if we take a snapshot of the economy at
any given point, we will find different investors holding different expectations regarding endogenous
economic outcomes, even though they hold identical expectations regarding all exogenous economic
fundamentals. This idiosyncratic variation in "sentiment" or "optimism" regarding the endogenous
prospects of the economy requires neither any differences in information regarding fundamentals
nor any deviation from Baycsian rationality; rather, it emerges as a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Formally, this is achieved by the introduction of "private sunspots". Like the public sunspots
that are familiar from previous work in macroeconomics, the private sunspots considered in this
paper are payoff-irrelevant random variables. But unlike public sunspots, private sunspots are only
imperfectly correlated across agents and are privately observed by them. The equilibria that obtain
with private sunspots are thus closely related to the correlated equilibria introduced in game theory
by Aumann (1974, 1987). In particular, the equilibria of the second model are hybrids of correlated
equilibria and (noisy) rational-expectations equilibria: the equilibrium price reveals partially the
aggregate sentiment (i.e., the average private sunspot) in the market.
As an example, one could imagine the agents measuring the brightness of the sun or the tem-
perature outside their houses; idiosyncratic measurement error could then be a natural source of
imperfect correlation. Alternatively, one could imagine the agents reading a newspaper in search
of clues about what action other agents are likely to coordinate on; the choice of what newspaper
to read, or the interpretation of what any given newspaper says, could then be somewhat idiosyn-
cratic. However, one need not take these examples too literally. Rather, one should think of private
sunspots as modeling devices that permit the construction of equilibria in which different investors
have different degrees of optimism regarding the endogenous prospects of the economy.
One interpretation is that private sunspots rationalize idiosyncratic investor sentiment; another
is that they capture, in a certain sense, idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding which equilibrium action
other agents are trying to coordinate on. Indeed, while the recent work on global games (e.g., Morris
and Shin, 1998) has addressed this issue indirectly by introducing private information about the
underlying payoffs (fundamentals), private sunspots address this issue at its heart by generating
such uncertainty as an integral, and self-fulfilling, feature of the equilibrium. But no matter one's
preferred interpretation, there is a number of novel positive and normative implications that they
deliver for the class of coordination models that this paper is concerned with.
On the positive front, I highlight that models with macroeconomic complementarities can gener-
ate significant heterogeneity in real and financial investment choices. Such heterogeneity can obtain
even in the absence—or after controlling for—any heterogeneity in exogenous individual characteris-
tics, but only to the extent that individual incentives depend strongly enough on forecasts of others'
choices. Furthermore, I show how introducing idiosyncratic extrinsic uncertainty can significantly
enrich, not only the cross-sectional, but also the aggregate outcomes of these models. In the two
models considered in this paper, with public sunspots aggregate investment and asset prices can only
take two extreme values ("high" and "low"); with private sunspots, instead, aggregate investment
and asset prices can follow smooth stochastic processes spanning the entire interval between these
two extreme values. Private sunspots can thus generate much smoother aggregate fluctuations than
public sunspots, indeed fluctuations that are more reminiscent of unique-equilibria models.
On the normative front, I show that ignoring private sunspots may lead to erroneous welfare
and policy conclusions. Like many of the pertinent models on coordination failures, the models
considered in this paper feature two equilibria in the absence of sunspots and these equilibria
are Pareto-ranked: there is a "good" equilibrium in which everybody invests, along with a "bad"
equilibrium in which nobody invests. Adding public sunspots only randomizes among those two
extreme levels of investment, achieving convex combinations of the welfare obtained in the two
sunspot-less equilibria. Therefore, as long as one restricts attention to public sunspots, one can
safely draw two conclusions: that the occurrence of an investment crash is prima-facia evidence of
coordination failure; and that policy interventions that preclude this outcome (at no or small cost)
are bound to .improve welfare.
These conclusions outline what, I believe, is the conventional wisdom about the welfare and
policy implications of coordination problems in macroeconomics. Nevertheless, neither conclusion
is warranted once private sunspots are allowed. Assuming that aggregate investment is excessive in
the "good" equilibrium relative to the first best, I construct an equilibrium with private sunspots
in which the economy fluctuates between states during which only a subset of the investors invest
("normal times") and states during which nobody invests ("crashes"). Because the aggregate level
of investment is now closer to the first-best level during normal times, this equilibrium can achieve
higher welfare than the equilibrium where everybody invests. However, for certain individuals to
have an incentive not to invest during normal times, it must be that these individuals believe that
a crash will take place with sufficiently high probability, while many other individuals believe the
opposite. But then note that, as long as agents are rational, such heterogeneity in beliefs is possible
in equilibrium only if a crash does materialize with positive probability.
In conclusion, an occasional cra.sh—what looks as apparent coordination failure—is actually
boosting welfare by facilitating idiosyncratic uncertainty and thereby providing the necessary in-
centive that keeps investment from being excessive during normal times. It then also follows that
well-intended policies that aim at preventing apparent coordination failures could actually reduce
welfare by eliminating the aforementioned incentive.
Related literature. The literature on macroeconomic complementarities, coordination failures,
and sunspots is voluminous. Key contributions include Azariadis (1981), Azariadis and Guesnerie
(1986), Benhabib and Farmer (1984, 1999), Cass and Shell (1983), Chatterjee, Cooper and Raviku-
mar (1993), Cooper and John (1988), Cooper (1999), Farmer (1993), Farmer and Woodford (1997),
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Guesnerie and Woodford (1992), Howitt and McAfee (1992), Kiyotaki
(1988), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Matsuyama (1991), Obstfeld (1986, 1996), Shell (1977, 1989),
and Woodford (1986, 1987, 1991).
All the aforementioned papers consider only aggregate extrinsic uncertainty. To the best of
my knowledge, the only notable exemption of a macro-finance application that features private
extrinsic signals is the paper by Jackson and Peck (1991) on speculative trading. That paper
studies an overlapping generations model of rational bubbles, in which asset prices are determined
by a Vickrey auction. Similarly to the present paper, that earlier work allows traders to condition
their bids on private extrinsic signals, although it does not allow the asset prices to reveal any
information about these signals. It then proves the existence of speculative equilibria in which
traders act on these signals and shows how the resulting equilibria can help rationalize technical
analysis in asset markets. 1 Relative to this previous work, the main contribution of the present
paper is to introduce idiosyncratic extrinsic uncertainty within a different class of macroeconomic
applications and to uncover a novel set of positive and normative predictions for these applications. 2
A secondary difference is that here I study a setting where equilibrium asset prices are allowed to
aggregate the underlying extrinsic private information in a rational-expectations fashion.
'See also Jackson (1994) for an extension of the existence results in Jackson and Peck (1991); and Aumann, Peck
and Shell (1988) and Peck and Shell (1991) for more abstract analyses of the relation between sunspot equilibria in
general-equilibrium market economies and correlated equilibria in games.
2 In this regard, marginally related is Solomon (2003). That paper considers a model in which two countries play a
bank-run game, introduces country-specific sunspots (sunspots publicly observed by the residents of one country but
not the residents of the other country), and shows how the correlation of the two country-specific sunspots generates
a twin crisis. That paper does not consider any of the positive and normative properties that I study here.
Research on this particular class of applications has recently been revived by the global-games
contributions of Morris and Shin (1998, 2001, 2003) and others; see, for example, Angeletos et
al (2007), Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006), Dasgupta (2007), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005),
Guimaraes and Morris (2007), Heinemann and Illing (2002), Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvinski (2006),
Rochet and Vives (2004), Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008), and Tarashev (2007). This literature in-
troduces heterogeneous information regarding the underlying economic fundamentals (the payoff
structure) within the same class of coordination models as this paper. Clearly, heterogeneous infor-
mation about the fundamentals also generates heterogeneity in beliefs and actions. However, this
heterogeneity in beliefs and actions is not a purely self-fulfilling property as in this paper. Also, the
strategic uncertainty that originates from heterogeneous information about the fundamentals only
reduces the set of equilibria. Indeed, in the limit case often studied in this literature, namely the
limit as private information gets infinitely precise relative to public information, a unique equilib-
rium is selected and in this equilibrium all agents take the same action. In contrast, the strategic
uncertainty that results from private sunspots expands the set of equilibria while also accommodat-
ing heterogeneity in beliefs. The contribution of the paper is then to show what kind of positive
and normative outcomes this heterogeneity can sustain within the applications of interest.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model
and revisits the set of equilibria with public sunspots. Section 3 introduces private sunspots and
studies their positive implications. Section 4 studies a variant model that captures trading in
financial markets. Section 5 turns to normative implications. Section 6 concludes.
2 The baseline model: a real investment game
The economy is populated by a measure- 1 continuum of agents (investors), who are indexed by
i £ [0, 1], are endowed with one unit of wealth each, and decide how to allocate this wealth between
a safe technology and a risky alternative whose return depends on the aggregate level of investment
in that technology. Let R denote the return to the safe technology, ki the investment of agent i
in the risky technology, K the aggregate level of investment, and A{K ) the excess return of this
technology relative to the safe one. The payoff of i is
tt, = U(ku K) = (1 - ki)R + k,{R + A{K)) =R + A{K)kt .
The key assumption needed for.the positive results of this paper is that there exists a k e (0, 1)
such that A(K) < for all K < k and A(K) > for all K > k. This assumption introduces
strategic complementarity in investment choices and guarantees the existence of two Nash equilibria,
one where all agents invest their entire wealth in the risky technology and another where all agents
invest their entire wealth in- the safe technology. To simplify the analysis, I henceforth normalize
R = and let A(K) = -c < for K < k and A{K) = b - c > for K > k, where b > c > 0.
One can then think of c as parameterizing the cost of investing in the risky technology, k as the
minimal level of aggregate investment for which the technology becomes profitable, and b as the
gross benefit enjoyed in that event. 3 To simplify the exposition I further assume that investment is
indivisible: each investor can choose either ki — 1 (which I henceforth call simply "invest") or k% —
("don't invest"), so that K is also the mass of agents investing. 4
Model interpretation and remarks. The key ingredient of the model is the presence of a co-
ordination problem. Such a coordination problem is the core element of models of self-fulfilling bank
runs, speculative currency attacks, and other macroeconomics crises (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig,
1983; Obstfeld, 1986, 1996). Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, the particular coordination
game we are employing here is nearly identical to the class of incomplete-information games re-
cently used by Morris and Shin (1998) and others in the applied global-games literature to study
crises. Like that recent work, we abstract from institutional details in order to concentrate on
the role of coordination and to keep the analysis tractable in the presence of incomplete informa-
tion. But whereas that work focuses on intrinsic private signal regarding the underlying economic
fundamentals, here we shift focus to extrinsic private signals.
In other macro applications, similar coordination problems originate in production, demand,
thick-market, or credit-market externalities. See, for example, Diamond (1976) for thick-market
externalities; Kiyotaki (1988) and Woodford (1991) for aggregate demand externalities; Azariadis
and Smith (1998), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Matsuyama (2007) for complementarities due to
credit frictions; Chatterjee, Cooper and Ravikumar (1993) for complementarities in business forma-
tion; and Cooper (1999) for an excellent review of the role of complementarities in macroeconomics.
The deeper foundations of the coordination problem are, of course, specific to each particular
application. However, modeling these foundations does not appear to be essential for the purposes
3 All these parameters are common knowledge—there is no uncertainty about the economic fundamentals.
4 Clearly, as long as agents are risk neutral, the indivisibility assumption is completely inconsequential.
of this paper. What is essential is only that the coordination problem opens the door to extrinsic
uncertainty. At the same time, note that the framework introduced so far abstracts from how
prices may limit idiosyncratic extrinsic uncertainty—a possibility that is evidently relevant for most
applications of interest. I will deal with this issue in Section 4.
Public sunspots. As noted above, the model admits exactly two equilibria in the absence of
sunspots. To see this, note that, in the absence of sunspots, the aggregate level of investment is
deterministic, 5 and the best response of investor i is simply
1 if K > k
ki = BR{K) =
if K < k
It follows that there exist exactly two equilibria: one in which everybody invests (fcj = K = 1 for all
i) and another in which nobody invests (&t = K = for all z). 6 The one equilibrium is sustained by
the self-fulfilling expectation that everybody will invest; the other by the self-fulfilling expectation
that nobody will invest. In either case, investors face no uncertainty about what choices other
investors are making and perfectly coordinate on the same course action.
We now introduce public sunspots. Before making their choices, all investors observe a payoff-
irrelevant random variable s, whose support is § C K and whose cumulative distribution function
(cd.f.) is F : § —-> [0, 1]. Because the investors can now condition their choices on s, the aggregate
level of investment can be stochastic. However, because s is publicly observed, the investors face
no uncertainty about the equilibrium level of investment and continue to make identical choices.
Equilibria with public sunspots are thus merely lotteries over the two sunspot-less equilibria.
Proposition 1 For any equilibrium with public sunspots, there exists ap 6 [0, 1] such that K{s) = 1
with probability p and K(s) = with probability 1 — p. Conversely, for any p G [0, 1], there exists
an equilibrium, in which K{s) — 1 with probability p and K(s) = with probability 1 — p.
Beliefs and actions vary across equilibria, or across realizations of the public sunspot, but never in
the cross-section of investors: in any given equilibrium and for any given realization of the sunspot,
all investors share the same "sentiment" (i.e., the same belief about all endogenous outcomes), can
5 Because there is a continuum of investors, this is true even if investors follow mixed strategies.
6When A(k) = 0, there also exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each investor invests with probabilit}'
k. I have ruled out this equilibrium by assuming A(k) ^ 0. This is not essential for any of the results: in the
aforementioned mixed-strategy equilibrium, investors do not face any uncertainty and share the same beliefs.
perfectly forecast one another's choices, and end up taking exactly the same action. The next
section shows how none of these properties need to hold once we allow for private sunspots.
3 Private sunspots and idiosyncratic sentiment *
I introduce private sunspots as follows. First, "Nature" draws a payoff-irrelevant random variable
s that is not observed by any investor. The support of this variable is S C K and its c.d.f. is
F : § —> [0,1]. Then, each investor privately observes a payoff-irrelevant random variable m.
Conditional on s, m is i.i.d. across investors, with support MCR and c.d.f. * : M x S —> [0, 1].
These variables define what I call "private sunspots": they are private signals of the underlying
unobserved common sunspot s. I henceforth call (§, F, M, $) the "sunspot structure" and define an
equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1 An equilibrium with private sunspots consists of a sunspot structure (S, F, M, \I>) and
a strategy k : M —> {0, 1} such that
' k(m) G arg max U(k, K(s))dP(s\m.) VmG
fce{o,i}ys
with K(s) = JM k(m)d'i(m\s) Vs G S, and with P(s\m) denoting the c.d.f. of the posterior about s
conditional on m (as implied by Bayes' rule).
Note that the sunspot structure (§, F, M, \P) is not part of the exogenous primitives of the
environment. Rather, it is a modeling device that permits the construction of equilibria that sustain
endogenous stochastic variation, not only in the aggregate, but also in the cross-section of agents.
In the remainder of this section, I consider a specific Gaussian sunspot structure that best illustrates
the novel positive properties equilibria with private sunspots can lead to.
Gaussian sunspots. Suppose s is drawn form a Normal distribution with mean /i s 6R and
variance a^ > 0. The private signal observed by investor i is. m, = s + e l , where £j is Normal
noise, i.i.d. across investors and independent of s, with variance a 4; > 0. One can then think
of s as the "brightness of the sun" or the "average temperature in a city" and Ei as idiosyncratic
measurement error. The next proposition then constructs equilibria where an investor invests if and
only if his private measurement of the brightness of the sun or the temperature is sufficiently high.
In these equilibria, an investor's private sunspot captures his idiosyncratic sentiment regarding the
prospects of the economy: the higher m, the higher the investor's expectation of the aggregate level
of investment.
Proposition 2 For any (fis ,o-s ,a€ ), there exists an equilibrium in which the following are true:
(i) An investor invests when m > m* and not when m < m*
,
for some m* £ R.
(ii) The aggregate level of investment is stochastic, with full support on (0, 1).
(Hi) The cross-sectional distribution of expectations regarding the aggregate level of investment,
E[A'|m], has full support on (0, 1).
Proof. Let <E> denote the c.d.f. of the standard Normal distribution. Suppose there exists an
m* such that an investor invests if and only if m > m*. Aggregate investment is then given by
K(s) = Prfm > m*\s) = $ s
— m
(1)
and therefore K (s) > k if and only if s > s*, where
s* = m* +<t£$ -1 (k,) (2)
Because both the prior about s and the signal m are Gaussian, the posterior about s conditional on m
is Normal with mean E[s|m]
(7 S +C7e
[i s — s* and variance Var[s|m] = (a s 2 + ae 2 ) l .
It follows that the expected return from investing conditional on signal m is
E[A(K{s))\m] =6Pr(s> s*|m) - c = 6$ \Ja7 +<ri
crs +crc
T/^5
Note that the latter is strictly increasing in m. For the proposed strategy to be part of an equilibrium,
it is thus necessary and sufficient that m* satisfies E[yl|m*] = 0, or equivalently
7^^m * + ^=fe^' - s * =^n^ 1 (I) (3)
Substituting s* from condition (2) into (3) and rearranging gives
^-/*.-»-{4^*" 1W + yi+^*" 1 (f)}. (4)
which completes the proof of part .(i). Part (ii) then follows from condition (1). Finally, part (iii)
follows from part (ii) along with the fact that both the distribution of s conditional on m and that
of m conditional on s have full supports. QED
Note that different investors hold different expectations about the distribution of the signals
771 in the population. In the equilibria constructed above, this means that different investors also
hold different expectations about the mass of investors who have received m > m*. The end result
is different expectations about the aggregate level of investment, which in turn sustain different
individual investment choices—a sharp difference from the case with public sunspots.
Because this heterogeneity in expectations and choices can not be traced to any heterogeneity
in primitive characteristics (preferences, endowments, technologies, or payoff-relevant information),
it can be interpreted as idiosyncratic: variation in "sentiment" or "optimism". This optimism is
with regard to the endogenous prospects of the economy. It does not require any heterogeneity
in expectations regarding the exogenous primitives of the environment, nor any deviation from
Bayesian rationality. Rather, it is merely, and purely, a self-fulfilling equilibrium property.
Finally, note that, in the equilibria constructed above, the aggregate level of investment has
full support on the (0,1) interval. In contrast, in the equilibria with no or only public sunspots,
the aggregate level of investment could take only the extreme values and 1. Therefore, private
sunspots permit, not only endogenous heterogeneity in the cross-section of the population, but also
a richer set of aggregate outcomes.
A simple dynamic extension. To better appreciate the aggregate implications of private
sunspots, consider the following dynamic extension. There is an infinite number of periods. In
each period t, each investor choses whether to invest (kt = 1) or not (kt = 0). He then receives a
contemporaneous payoff nt = A(Kt )kt, where Kt is the aggregate level of investment in period t
and A{Kt) is the net return to investment, with A(Kt) = b — c > if Kt > k and A(Kt) — —c <
if Kt < k. The investor's intertemporal payoff is simply ]Ct^o^<7r<' where 6 (0, 1).
The sunspot structure is wherein the interesting dynamics enter. The unobserved sunspot in
period t is given by st = pst-i + u t , where p £ (0, 1) is the auto-correlation in the sunspot and ut
is white noise, i.i.d. across time, with variance a\. The private sunspot observed by an investor in
period t is m,j — st + et, where et is white noise, i.i.d. across agents and time, with variance a\.
10
Now note that investors may learn over time about past realized sunspots by the observation
of past aggregate investment and/or past payoffs. To maintain the analysis tractable, I ignore
the learning through payoffs. I also assume that investors observe noisy private signals of past
investment: each investor observes in period t a signal x t = §~ l (Kt -\) + &,where & is white
noise, i.i.d. across agents and time, with variance aj. These assumptions guarantee the existence of
equilibria in which the information structure remains Gaussian. 7
Indeed, as shown in the Appendix, we can find a sequence {m1,at]^L and an equilibrium in
which the following hold: (i) the entire sequence of private signals up to period t can be summarized
in a sufficient statistic m t , which is Normal, i.i.d. across investors, with mean s and variance a\\
and (ii) an investor invests in period t if and only if fht >m*t . Along this equilibrium, the sufficient
statistic rht and its variance at can be constructed recursively as functions oi\fht-\,at-\\mt,Xt).
Moreover, as the history gets arbitrarily long, (ml, at) converges to some time-invariant (m",a.)
We thus obtain a stationary equilibrium along which aggregate investment is given by
. ... i s t ~ rn*KAs x ) = $
Hence, up to a monotone transformation, aggregate investment follows a smooth AR(1) process. 8
Note then that fictitious data generated by the present model would be virtually indistinguish-
able from fictitious data generated by a canonical unique-equilibrium model. This would not be
the case if we had ignored private sunspots: aggregate investment could then only feature discrete
fluctuations (between and 1), which would be more telling of multiple equilibria. We conclude that
private sunspots can help generate very smooth aggregate fluctuations, making it difficult to identify
fluctuations driven by sunspots from fluctuations driven by smooth changes in fundamentals.
"Learning to coordinate." As another example of the rich dynamics that private sunspots
can sustain, I now consider the following variant. Investors continue to receive the exogenous and
'The assumption that investors do not learn from their past payoffs is merely for convenience and can be justified
as follows. Let the payoff of an investor be nt = ztkt, where zt = A(Kt ) +oJt and where u>t is white noise, i.i.d. across
both time and agents, with variance a^. Suppose further that zt is privately observed by the investor, independent^'
of his choice of investment; this kills the value for experimentation that would have emerged if zt was observed only
when ki = 1 . Then, the observation of nt conveys no more information than zt , which by itself is a noisy private signal
of Kt. Qualitatively, this is much alike the noisy private signal xt that we have already introduced. The only difference
is that the information contained z t is not Gaussian, making the updating of beliefs intractable. However, letting
Gu, —» oo avoids this problem by rendering the signal Zt uninformative. At the same time, because the expectation of
ujt is zero no matter <t^, investors continue to choose kt so as to maximize their expectation of A(Kt)kt. ft follows
that the error introduced by ignoring the information contained in payoffs vanishes as a^, —> oo.
8 To be precise, $~ 1 (Kt) is a Gaussian AR(1).
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endogenous private signals m. t and. x t considered above, but now the unobserved sunspot remains
constant over time: p = 1 and au = 0, so that St = s for all t.
As before, we can find an equilibrium in which an investor invests in period t if and only if
his sufficient statistic rht exceeds some deterministic threshold m*. For simplicity, suppose k =
c/b = 1/2, which gives ml = for all t. It follows that aggregate investment in period t is given
by Kt (s) = $ [~§l) Because of the accumulation of new signals, at is decreasing over time and
converges to zero as t —> oo. It follows that, whenever s > 0, Kt{s) is bounded in (1/2, 1) and
increasing over time, asymptotically converging to 1; and whenever s < 0, Kt(s) is bounded inside
(0, 1/2), and decreasing over time, asymptotically converging to 0.
Recall now that K = 1 and K = represent the only two equilibria that are possible in the
absence of private sunspots and that require all investors coordinating on the same course of action.
We can thus interpret the dynamics that obtain here with private sunspots as situations where
investors slowly learn on which action to coordinate: at any given date, some investors are making
the "wrong" investment choice (i.e., do the opposite of what the majority does), but the fraction of
investors who makes such a mistake falls over time and vanishes in the limit.
Also note that this form of learning can be either exogenous or endogenous: it can originate in
either the signals rat regarding the unobserved sunspot s or the signals xt regarding past aggregate
activity. We conclude that private sunspots can capture, not only the idea that agents may fail to
perfectly coordinate on the same course of action, but also the possibility that agents slowly learn
how to do so over time through the observation of one another's actions.
The form of social learning considered in this example is purely private, but one could easily
extend the analysis to public signals about either s or past activity. A certain kind of public signals
that is of special interest is prices; this bring us to the topic of the next section.
4 Private sunspots and financial markets
The preceding analysis has been conducted within a simple investment game that abstracted from
market interactions. I now consider a variant model in which investors trade an asset within a com-
petitive financial market. This exercise serves two purposes. First, it shows how the insights of the
preceding analysis translate in the context of financial markets. Second, it shows how imperfect cor-
relation can be accommodated within a rational-expectations-equilibrium framework, where prices
12
partially reveal the unobserved common sunspot component that drives the correlation among the
beliefs (the private sunspots) of different investors.
Model set-up. There is again a large number of risk-neutral investors, who now decide how
much to trade of a certain financial asset. An individual's investment in the asset is denoted by ki
and the aggregate investment by K. The price of the asset is denoted by p and its dividend by A.
The later is assumed to increase with aggregate investment in the asset: A = A (K). Finally, since
investors are risk-neutral, their payoffs arc simply given by
m = Il(ki,K,p) = [A(K)-p]ki .
To rule out infinite positions, I assume that ki is bounded in [k,k], for some finite k and k.
These bounds can be interpreted as the result of borrowing and short-selling constraints. (Allowing
for risk aversion would be another natural, but less tractable, way to ensure that investors take
finite positions.) Without any further loss of generality, let k = and k = 1. Finally, the supply of
the asset, which is denoted by Q, is assumed to be an increasing function of the price and of some
unobserved supply shock: Q — Q (p,u) , where uGllCR. The. shock u can also be interpreted as
the impact of "noise traders"; its sole role is to introduce noise in the price.
Remarks. Close cousins of this model have been used by Angeletos and Werning (2006), Hellwig
et al. (2006), Ozdenoren and Yuan (2007), and Tarashev (2006) to study bank runs, speculative
currency attacks, and other financial crises. The price can then be interpreted as the stock price
of a bank (in the context of bank runs), the domestic interest rate or the peso forward (in the
context of currency attacks, or the stock price of a company that faces a coordination problem
among its institutional stock holders (in Ozdenoren and Yuan's application on feedback effects in
financial markets). As in the baseline model, the positive dependence of A on K is the source of the
coordination problem. At the same time, the endogeneity of the price, along with an upward-sloping
supply for the asset, will be the source of a negative pecuniary externality—and of a certain form of
strategic substitutability—among the traders: the more other traders invest in the asset, the higher
the price an individual trader has to pay in order to invest in the asset.
Note that such an adverse price effect emerges quite naturally within the context of speculative
currency attacks: as long as the speculative attack is not sufficiently strong to trigger a collapse
(i.e., as long as K < k), the more the others speculate, the higher the individual cost of speculation,
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simply because the speculation typically leads to an increase in domestic interests rates and thereby
on the cost of borrowing and short-selling the domestic bond. More generally, such an adverse price
effect is generic to any asset market in which one set of agents (e.g., speculators) trades against
another set of agents (e.g., noise traders) whose net supply of the asset is upward sloping.
Alternatively, the model is interpreted as one of real—rather than financial—investment in a new
technology. In this case complementarity in A(K) could emerge from production or thick-market
externalities, while the adverse price effect could emerge from investors competing for a scarce input
(capital, labor, oil, etc.).
Rational-expectations equilibria with private sunspots. We introduce private sunspots
are introduced in the same fashion as in the baseline model: nature first draws an unobserved
common sunspot variable s G S from some distribution F; nature then sends each agent i a private
signal rrii G M, which is drawn i.i.d. across agents from a conditional distribution $ . These variables
are payoff-irrelevant and are independent of the supply shock u; they are once again devices that
introduce aggregate and idiosyncratic extrinsic uncertainty.
What is novel here relative to the model of the previous section is that the price that clears the
asset market may *publicly reveal information about these sunspot variables. This motivates the
following equilibrium definition, which introduces private sunspots within an otherwise-standard
rational-expectations equilibrium concept.
Definition 2 A rational- expectations equilibrium with private sunspots consists of a sunspot struc-
ture (S, F, M, ,3/), a price function P : § x M —> M., an individual demand function k : M x E —» [k,k],
and a belief (c.d.f.) /j, : S x R x M x K —> [0, 1], such that the following hold:
(i) Beliefs are consistent with Bayes rule given the equilibrium price function.
(ii) Given the beliefs and the price function, the demand function satisfies individual rationality:
k(m,p) G arg max / U.(k, K (s,P (s,u)) ,P (s,u))'dfj,(
fce[o,i] 7§xu
s,u\m,p) V(m,p)
where K(s,p) = fM k(m;p)dty(m\s) Vs G §.
(Hi) Given the demand function, the price function satisfi.es market- clearing:
K{s,P(s,u)) = Q(s,u) V(s,u).
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As in most rational-expectations models, the analysis is intractable without an "artful" choice
of distributional assumptions and functional forms. I thus assume that all uncertainty is Gaussian:
u ~ N (0, <t„) , s ~ N (ps , af) , and rrii = s + £i, where e.i ~ N (0, of ) is i.i.d. across agents and
independent of both s and u. I further impose the following functional forms for A and Q : A(K) = 1
if K > k and A{K) = otherwise, for some scalar k € (0, 1); and Q (p, u) = $ (u + \$~ l (p)) , for
some scalar A > 0. This scalar parameterizes the price elasticity of the supply of the asset, while $
denotes again the. c.d.f. of the standardized Normal distribution.
Equilibrium analysis. The next proposition establishes the existence of rational-expectations
equilibria in which investors' demand functions are decreasing in the price and increasing in their
private sunspots. As a result, the aggregate demand for the asset is increasing in s. Along with the
fact that supply is increasing in u, this ensures that the equilibrium price is increasing in both s
and u. Because the supply shock u is unobserved (recall, this shock captures more generally any
noise in prices), the price is only a noise indicator of the underlying common sunspot component s.
This ensures that, although investors do learn something about one another's' investment choices
from the observed price, they continue to face some residual idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding one
another's investment choices, and hence about the eventual dividend of the asset. As a result, these
equilibria feature different investors finding it strictly optimal to make different portfolio choices,
even though they all share the same preferences, constraints, and beliefs regarding any exogenous
component of asset returns—heterogeneity in portfolio choices originates merely in self-fulfilling
heterogeneity in beliefs regarding the endogenous component of asset returns.
Proposition 3 For any (cu ,A), there exists a rational- expectations with private sunspots in which
the following are true:
(i) An investor's equilibrium demand for the asset is given by
,
1 if m > m* (p)
k(m,p) =
otherwise
where m* (p) is a continuous increasing function of p. By implication, the aggregate demand for the
asset, K(s,p), is continuously increasing in s and continuously decreasing in p.
(ii) The equilibrium price is given by p = P (s, u) , where P is a continuously increasing function
of s and a continuously decreasing function of u.
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Proof. Consider a sunspot structure such that \aE (o~ 2 + a~ 2 +<j~ 2a~ 2 )~ l ' 2oJ 2a~ 2 > 1. Next,
suppose there exists an m* (p) such that an investor invests if and only if m > m* (p). Given the
proposed strategy, aggregate demand is given by
Market clearing imposes K (s) = Q {p,u) . Equivalently, p must satisfy m* (p)+aEA$ -1 (p) = s — aeu,
for all (s,u). Since the function m* is common knowledge in equilibrium (and so are ae , A, and $),
the observation of p is informationally equivalent to the observation of the signal
z(p) = m*(p) + CTE A<E>" 1 (p) = s + n, (5)
where n = —oeu is Normal noise with variance a 2 = cr 2a 2 . Because the prior about s, the private
signal m, and the public signal z are all Gaussian, the posterior about s conditional on m and p is
also Gaussian, with mean
' E[s|m,p] = ^V^ s + ^m+^z(p) (6)
apost apost apoat
and variance Var[s|m,p] = <Jp0St , where apos t = (a~ 2 + a~ 2 + o~ 2 )~ l l 2 . It follows that the expected
dividend conditional on signal m is
E[A|m,p] = Pr [K(s,p) > K\m,p] = Pr [s > m* (p) + <te$ -1 (k.) | m,p]
= ^[^{E[s\m,p}--m''(p)-a^- 1 (K)))
By (6), the latter is increasing in m. It follows that an investor finds it optimal to invest if and only
if and only if m > m** (p) , where m** (p) is the unique solution to
<D (^ (E[s|m** (p) ,p] - m* (p) - aE^ l (K))j = p
In any equilibrium, m** (p) = m* (p) . Along with (6), this gives a unique solution for m*(p):
m* (p ) = ^ + a£$ ] («) + [\aEaposta- 2 - l] a 2s crpo\ t$ ' (p)
.
(7)
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We conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium demand function, which is given by
j 1 if m > m* (p)
k{m,p) = (
! otherwise
with m* (p) as in (7). By assumption, A(T£ (jpOStO'~
2 > 1, which guarantees that m* (p) is a contin-
uously increasing in p and hence the equilibrium demand for the asset is continuously decreasing
in p. Along with the fact that the supply of the asset is continuously increasing in p, this also
guarantees that there exists a unique equilibrium price function, p — P (s , u) . The latter is found
by substituting m* (p) from (7) into (5) and solving for p. Doing so gives
r> ( \-k s-aEu- p,s -aE$- l {K) \p — P (s.u) — <P
-1
'post
,
[\aeapost (cr„
2 + 0-2) - l] a~a'
p
which is continuously increasing in s and continuously decreasing in u. QED
In the equilibria constructed above, the aggregate demand for the asset is globally decreasing
in its price and therefore intersects only once with supply. Moreover, these equilibria feature only
smooth fluctuations in asset prices. This is unlike the backward-bending demand functions, multiple
demand-supply intersections, and discrete price changes (crashes) featured in Angeletos and Werning
(2006), Barlevy and Veronesi (2003), or Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008). Therefore, an outsider could,
once again, fail to distinguish empirically this model from a smoother, unique-equilibrium model of
the financial market.
5 Private sunspots and efficiency
In the baseline model of Sections 2 and 3, the best sunspot-less equilibrium (the one in which K — 1)
coincides with the first-best allocation. This, however, need not be the case in general. Investment
booms may sometimes be excessive, leading to inefficient, bubbles, crowding out of other productive
activities, or having adverse price effects. For any of these reasons, the sunspot-less equilibrium
with high investment (K — 1) may feature inefficiently high investment, even if it is it is the best
among all equilibria with no (or only public) sunspots.
In a certain sense, this is precisely the case in the financial-market model of Section 4. In that
model, a proper welfare analysis is complicated by the fact that I have assumed an exogenous supply
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of the asset: I have not modeled the "noise traders" that lie behind this supply. We can nevertheless
bypass this complication by focusing on the welfare of the investors that have been modeled—think
of the latter as domestic agents and the ones behind the supply as "unloved" foreigners. Note then
that higher aggregate investment implies a higher price at which the asset can be acquired. As a
result, although domestic investors are better off in the equilibrium in which K — 1 than the one
in which K — 0, they would have been even better off if they could somehow coordinate on some
K £ (k, 1), for they would have then guaranteed the same rate of return at a lower price.
Whenever there are such inefficiencies, it is natural to think about Pigou-like policies that
correct these inefficiencies and implement the first-best allocation as an equilibrium (although not
necessarily the unique one). Suppose, though, that such policies are unavailable, too costly, or far
from perfect, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper. I will now show how private
sunspots, unlike public sunspots, can then improve welfare.
Towards this goal, consider the following variant of the baseline model. The net return to
investment is now given by
j 1-c-hK if K > k
A(K) = (8)
,
I -c - hK if K < k
where k 6 (0, ^] and h > 0.
9 The baseline model is nested with h = 0. Allowing h > introduces
a congestion effect: a negative externality and a source of local substitutability like those featured
in Section 4. As noted already, such a congestion effect emerges naturally within the context of
speculative currency attacks and other financial crises, in the form of an adverse price effect; one
can thus interpret h also as a measure of the strength of this price effect.
In fact, what the model of this section does is precisely to allow for the adverse price effect that
was featured in the model of Section 4 while also abstracting from the informational role of prices.
Without this abstraction, it would be impossible to characterize the set of equilibria with arbitrary
private sunspots; instead, we would have to limit attention within the class of Gaussian sunspots.
For the purposes of this section, however, we prefer to pay the cost of this abstraction for the benefit
of identifj'ing the best equilibrium among all equilibria with arbitrary private sunspots.
Before doing that, I revisit the set of equilibria with public sunspots and also characterize the
level of investment that maximizes the investors' welfare.
9 Letting b = 1 is merely a normalization, while k < ^ simplifies a step in the proof of Proposition 5.
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Proposition 4 Suppose ft G (^5^1 1 — c) .
(i) There exist only two sunspot-less equilibria, one with K = 1 and another with K = 0.
(ii) The equilibrium in which K = 1 achieves higher welfare (ex-ante utility) than the equilibrium
in which K — 0, as well as than any equilibrium with public sunspots.
(Hi) The first-best level of aggregate investment is K* G [re, 1).
Proof. Part (i) follows from the fact that A(K) < for all K G [0, re) and, as long as h < 1 - c,
A(K) > for all K G [re, 1). Now let w(K) denote welfare (ex-ante utility) when the fraction of
agents investing is K :
w{K) = KU(l,K) + (1 - A')II(0, A) = KA{K).
For part (ii), note that w{\) — 1 — c — h and tu(0) = 0, so that the result follows again from the
assumption h < 1 — c. Finally, for part (iii), note that w (K) is continuous, strictly decreasing, and
strictly concave for K < k; it has an upward jump at K = k (at which point it is right- but not left-
continuous); and thereafter it is again continuous and strictly concave, but possibly non-monotonic.
In particular, for K > re, w' (K) — 1 — c — 2hK, so that the first-best level of investment is given by
K* = argmax w(K)
re if 1 - c - 2hn <
K v ' 2h^r G (re, 1) if 1 -c-2/i< < 1 - c - 2/ire (9)
if 1 - c - 2ft >
Therefore, A" < 1 if and only if ft > ^. QED
The key result here is that, as long as the congestion effect is not too high (ft < 1 - c), there
continue to exist exactly two equilibria in the absence of sunspots; but, as long as the congestion
effect is not too low (ft > ^^), neither equilibrium is first-best efficient. That public sunspots can
not improve upon those two equilibria is clear: public sunspots only attain convex combinations of
the welfare levels attained by the two sunspot-less equilibria and they are thus dominated by the
equilibrium in which K = 1. This, however, is not true once we allow for private sunspots.
As noted in the Introduction, this is not completely surprising given Aumann's result that
correlated equilibria in general sustain a large set of outcomes than Nash equilibria. However, one
needs to verify that this is indeed the case for the particular model considered here, as well as to
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appreciate this possibility within the particular model. To accomplish both tasks at the same time, I
opt to characterize the best possible equilibrium that can obtain with private sunspots. This permits
me to identify, for the model at hand, what equilibrium properties are necessary for efficiency when
one allows for private sunspots—and then to contrast them with those that obtain if one ignores
private sunspots.
Proposition 5 Suppose h £ (1 — \fc, 1 — c) , allow for private sunspots, and consider the set of
equilibria that maximize welfare. There exists a unique pair (q",p*), with K* < q* < 1 and <
p* < 1, such that all these equilibria are characterized by the followinq properties:
(i) K{s) — q* with probability p* and K(s) = with probability 1 — p* ; thai is, the economy fluc-
tuates between "normal times", events during which aggregate investment is positive, and "crashes",
events during which investment collapses to zero.
(ii) q* and p* decrease with c or h; that is, the probability of a crash increases, and the level of
investment in normal times decreases, as fundamentals get worse.
Proof. By the revelation principle, any equilibrium with private sunspots can be represented
by a c.d.f. F : [0, 1] —» [0, 1] such as the following hold: first, "Nature" draws q from F; next, a
"mediator" sends private messages that say "invest" to a fraction q of the population, while it sends
private messages that say "don't invest" to the remaining fraction 1 — q; finally, investors find it
individually rational to follow the action recommended in their respective messages. 10 We can thus
identify the best equilibria by studying the distributions F that maximize welfare (ex-ante utility)
subject to the relevant incentive-compatibility constraints.
Take any F. Let p,\ (resp., /iq) be the c.d.f. of the posterior about q for' an investor who receives
the message "invest" (resp., "don't invest"). By Bayes' rule,
^q'dF(q') f*(l-qi)dF(q>)
Jo q'dF{q') JQ (1 ~q')dF{q')
For the recommended actions to be incentive-compatible, the expected net return from investing
must be positive conditional on the message "invest" and negative conditional on the message "don't
Restricting attention to pure strategies is immaterial because of the continuum of agents.
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invest": / A (q) dfi\ (g) > and fQ A (g) d(j,Q (q) < 0. Using (10), these constraints reduce to
W{F)= ( w(q)dF{q)>0 and R (F) = f r (<?) dF (q) < 0,
Jo Jo
where w (q) = qA (q) and r (q) = (1 - q) A (q) . For any F that satisfies these constraints, welfare
(ex-ante utility) is given as follows:
En= f [qU(l,q) + (l-q)U(0,q)}dF(q)= f w (q) dF (q) = W (F) .
Jo Jo
The best equilibria are thus identified by maximizing W(F) subject to W(F) > > R(F). Clearly,
the set of F that satisfy these constraints is non-empty and the constraint W(F) > does not
bind at the optimum. The remainder of the proof thus characterizes the functions F that maximize
W{F) among the set of non-decreasing functions F : [0. 1] —> [0, 1] that satisfy R(F) < 0.
I first show that any solution to this problem assigns zero measure to q G (0,K*). Towards
a contradiction, take any F that violates this property and construct a variation F by letting
F (q) = lim^^- F (q) for q € [0, K*) and F (q) = F (q) for q > K*\ F is thus constructed from F
by reassigning to q = all the mass that F assigns to q £ [0, k) and to q = K* all the mass that
F assigns to q G [k, K*}, while not affecting the mass assigned to q > K*. As illustrated in the left
panel of Figure 1, the function w (q) = qA (q) is continuous and strictly decreasing in q for q < k; it
has an upward jump at q = re; and thereafter it is again continuous and strictly concave, reaching
it's maximum at q = K* G [re, 1). It follows that w (0) > w (q) for all q G [0, re) and w {K*) > w (q)
for all q G [«,!]. By implication, the variation F improves welfare:
W(F) - W(F) = f [w (0) - w (<?)] dF (q) + [ [w [K*) - w {q)\ dF (g) > 0.
Jo Jk
Next, as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1, r (q) = (1 — q)A(q) is continuous and strictly
increasing in q for q G [0, re); 11 it has an upward jump at q = re; and it is continuous and strictly
decreasing in q for q G [re, 1]. It follows that the variation F relaxes incentive compatibility:
R(F) -R(F)= r [r (0) - r (q)} dF (q) + f [r (K*) - r (q)] dF (q) < 0.J0 Jk
n That r(q) is increasing for all q £ [0, k) is guaranteed by the assumption that K < 1/2 and holds more generally
as long as c 4- h(l — 2k) > 0.
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Figure 1: The functions w(q) = qA{q) and r(q) = (1 — q)A(q)
Since the variation F is both feasible and welfare-improving, no F that assigns positive measure to
q 6 (0, A*) can be optimal. We conclude that, for any optimal F, there exists a scalar p G [0, 1]
and a c.d.f. G : [A"*, 1] -> [0, 1] such that F (q) = 1 - p for q < K* and F {q) = (1 - p) +pG (q) for
q > K*. That is, 1 — p is the mass assigned to q = 0, p is the mass assigned to q > A'*, and G is
the distribution of q conditional on q > A*. It then also follows that
W{F) = {l-p)w(0)+p f w{q)dG(q) and R (F) = (1 - p) r (0) + p / r(q)dG(q).
Jk" Jk"
Consider now the subproblem of choosing G for given p e (0, 1]. This is the same as maximizing
W (G) subject to R (G) < 6 (p) , where 1^ (G) = /^.. w (g) dG (q) , R{G) = f£. r (q) dG {q) , and
b (p) = — (1 — p) r (0) /p. Because this is a convex optimization problem, there exists a Lagrange
multiplier Ap > such that the optimal G solves maxg JK . [w {q) - Xpr (q)]dG (q) . But now note
that, for any Ap > 0, the function w (q) — \pr (q) is continuous and strictly concave in q over [A'*, 1] ,
and therefore there exists a unique qp such that qp = argmax9gf^-. 1i['u; (q) — Xpr (q)], which in turn
implies that the optimal G assigns all measure to q — qp . We can thus identify any optimal F with
a pair (p, q) G [0, 1] x [K* , 1] that maximizes W{p, q) = (1 — p) w (0) + pw (q) subject to
R(p, q) = {l-p)r{0)+pr (g) < 0. [IX)
Note that the constraint (11) must bind: if it did not, the optimum would be (p,q) = (1, A""),
but then (11) would be violated, since r (K*) = (1 - K*)A(K*) > 0. Thus, let A* > be the
Lagrange multiplier associated with (11). Using the fact that w (0) = and r (0) = .4 (0) = -c, the
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Figure 2: Comparative statics of best private-sunspot equilibrium.
first-order conditions for q and p reduce to the following:
< if q* = K*
w'(q*)-Xr'{q*){ = if q*
€
(K*, 1) W (q*) - \[r (q*) + c] <
> if q* = 1
< if p* =
= o ifp*e(o,i) (12)
> if p* = 1
Recall that r' (q) < for all q 6 [AT*, 1]. Together with w' (A") = and A* > 0, this rules out
q* = K*. If p* = 1, (11) implies q* = 1. But then the left part of (12) gives w (1) - A* [r (1) + c] >
0, or equivalently A* < (1 - c - fo) /c, while the right part of (12) gives w' (1) - A*r'(l) > 0,
or equivalently A* > - (1 - c — 2h) / (I — c — h) . Hence, p* = 1 is possible only if q* — 1 and
- (1 - c - 2ft) / (1 - c - ft) < (1 - c - ft) /c; the latter in turn holds if and only if c < (1 - ft)
2
. If
instead p* < .1, then (11) gives r (q*) = c (1 - p*) /p* > 0, which guarantees that- q* < 1 and, along
with (12), gives the following unique non-negative solution (q*,p*, A*) :
9 =
ft
p =
ft^c"
ft-(l- y/c)'
A* =
(1 " v^)^
ft-(l-Vc)
2' (13)
Note then that this solution satisfies <j* < 1 and p* < 1 if and only if c > (1 — ft) 2 , or equivalently
ft > 1 - yfc\ if instead ft < 1 — %fc, the optimum is attained with q* = 1 and p* = 1. QED
This result establishes that the best equilibrium with private sunspots has the economy alternat-
ing between "normal times", i.e., states during which a large fraction of the population invests, and
"crashes", i.e., states during which nobody invests. From the perspective of the pertinent macroeco-
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nomics literature, this seems quite, paradoxical: the occurrence of a crash is considered prima-facia
evidence of a coordinate failure, for the best equilibrium with no or only public sunspots would
never feature a crash. The key to this apparent paradox is the incentive effect that the possibility of
a crash has during normal times. In particular, the fact that that many but not all investors invest
during normal times contributes towards higher welfare than in the best sunspot-less equilibrium:
the level of investment during normal times is now closer to the first-best level. However, for certain
individuals to have an incentive not to invest during normal times, it must be that these individuals
believe that a crash will take place with sufficiently high probability, while many other individuals
believe the opposite. In turn, such heterogeneity in beliefs is possible in equilibrium only if crashes
do happen with positive probability, which explains the result.
To further illustrate the economics behind the determination of the best equilibrium, Figure 2
considers its comparative statics with respect to c; the comparative statics with respect to h are
similar. The dashed line gives p* , while the solid line gives q* . For comparison, the dotted lined gives
A'*, the first-best level of investment . Note that q* > K* always, that p* < 1 and q* < 1 as soon
as 1 — y/c < h, and that thereafter both p* and q* decrease with c. In words, as the fundamentals
worsen, so that the first-best level of investment falls, the equilibrium level of investment during
normal times also falls, and the probability of a crash increases. This is true even though the best
sunspot-less equilibrium is invariant with the fundamentals.
6 Conclusion
The pertinent macroeconomics literature on coordination failures and crises has focused on aggregate
extrinsic uncertainty. In this paper, building upon Aumann's concept of correlated equilibria, I
showed how the introduction of idiosyncratic extrinsic uncertainty within the class of models used
by this literature uncovers some intriguing positive and normative properties that, albeit being
generic to this class of models, have not been appreciated within macroeconomics.
In one sense, the private sunspots considered in this paper capture the idea that agents face
uncertainty about which equilibrium is played: each individual does not know what is the action
upon which other agents are trying to coordinate. This is similar to the strategic uncertainty
featured in the recent work on global games, but does not inhibit equilibrium multiplicity. In
another sense, they capture idiosyncratic variation in investor sentiment: different agents hold
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different expectations regarding the endogenous prospects of the economy. Private sunspots can
thereby sustain significant heterogeneity in choices even in the absence of any heterogeneity in
primitive characteristics or hard information. These possibilities were absent from previous work:
in equilibria with public sunspots, all agents share the same beliefs about endogenous outcomes,
face no uncertainty about what other investors are doing, and play the same action.
Another intriguing possibility is that, with private sunspots, social learning can take place
with regard to endogenous coordination rather that exogenous fundamentals. In particular, asset
prices or other indicators of aggregate activity may facilitate better predictability of the endogenous
prospects of the economy and better coordination among the agents, even if there is nothing to be
learned from them regarding the exogenous economic fundamentals.
Finally, private sunspots may unrest the conventional wisdom regarding the normative proper-
ties of macroeconomic applications with coordination problems. In certain situations, occasional
investment crashes may be necessary for facilitating idiosyncratic uncertainty and thereby improv-
ing efficiency during normal times. When this is the case, what looks ex post as a coordination
failure is actually contributing towards higher ex-ante welfare; and policies aimed at preventing
such apparent coordination failures may backfire by eliminating a social mechanism that improves
efficiency during normal times.
Appendix: dynamics and learning
Consider the dynamic extension of Section 3. The sunspot s t follows an AR(1): st+\ — ps t + ut,
with ut ~ A/"(0, <7U ), s\ ~ Af(0,cr s ), and a s = —-. The private signals are given by m< = St + £t
and x t = $~ } (Kt) + £s, with e t ~ N{0,cr£ ) and £( ~ AA(0, c^). Let au = cr~ 2 , a^ = oj 2 , ae = a~ 2 .
Proposition 6 There exists a sequence {ml,at}'^L and an equilibrium such that (i) the private
information of an investor at t with respect to St is summarized in a sufficient statistic rht that is
Normal with mean s t and variance a2 , and (ii) an investor invests at t if and only if rht > mt-
Proof. The proof is by induction. The result trivially holds at t — 1, since the first period coincides
with the static benchmark. Thus suppose the result holds at t > 1. Then, Kt(sl) = $ f St
~m
t
J
ancj
25
xt+ i = -j^{st — ml) +£t+ii where 0t — a t , so that xt+\ is effectively a Gaussian signal about s t
with precision 0tct^. It follows that the private information regarding st+i can be summarized in a
sufficient statistic mt+\ that is Normal with mean st+i and variance <7 t
2
+1 = /^j, where
p
2 a„(l+Q £ )/3 ( f i ttt / » 1 _\1 , a, „iim*+i = ft +1 (a„+(i+«t )ft) ( I+^m< + TT^ [m t - W,Xt) ) + ^Tm *+1 ( 14 )
ft+i = r(A) = * + ae . 15
au + (1 + a4)ft
But then, by a similar argument as in Proposition 2, it is indeed a continuation equilibrium that an
investor invests in period t + 1 if and only if rht+i > m*+1 , where
m f*n = -<>• {%Sr^v) +
\l
i+^~ 1 (i)} • ( i6 )
which proves that the result holds at t + 1 and completes the induction argument.
Now note that, for any p e (0,1) and any finite (au , n^, ae ), the function T(0) is strictly
increasing and strictly concave, with T(0) > 0. It follows that (i) there exists a unique > such
that = T(0) and (ii) the sequence {/3t}£?. converges to this fixed point for any initial 0o > 0.
This proves the claim that, as the history becomes infinitely long, both m* and at converge.
Finally, consider the variant with learning over a constant underlying sunspot (st = s for all t).
This is nested with p — 1 and au = oo, in which case (15) reduces to 0t+i = r(A) — (!+&£)fit+&e- It
is then immediate that at decreases monotonically over time and asymptotes to as t —> oo. Finally,
letting k = c/b = 1/2 into (16) gives mj = for all t, as claimed in the main text.
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